Federal Areas: The Confusion of a Jurisdictional Geographical Dichotomy by Editors,
124 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
nificant contributions to the war effort, favorable experience with this
financing has encouraged banks to participate further in financing by
assignment of accounts receivable. The 1951 Amendment to the Assign-
ment of Claims Act leaves a security device that is essentially sound. Cer-
tain areas of legal uncertainty remain, but scarcely such as interfere with the
normal commercial calculation of risk.
FEDERAL AREAS: THE CONFUSION OF A
JURISDICTIONAL-GEOGRAPHICAL DICHOTOMY
Posing the Problem.-X was convicted of murder under a state crim-
inal statute. On appeal conviction was reversed for lack of jurisdiction be-
cause the crime was committed on a military reservation under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal government.' Subsequently X was indicted
under a federal statute. The federal court refused jurisdiction after deciding
that the land in question was in reality under the jurisdiction of the state.
2
Although X went free, the sovereignty of each government remained un-
impaired. While this is an extreme case it illustrates the fact that difficulties
arise because of the existence of federal areas within the geographic boun-
daries of the states. Moreover, their impact today is greater than ever
before.
Historically, the public domain comprised those lands beyond the
boundaries of the original states, but as new states were formed out of
these areas the federal government reserved certain portions within state
borders. Besides these "public lands" there are so-called "acquired lands"
which have been secured from the states or private owners by purchase,
gift or condemnation. At the present time there are approximately
455,000,000 acres under federal ownership which is 23% of the total land
area of the continental United States.3  About 907 of this land is "public
domain" and 10% is "acquired." 4
Vast amounts of the public lands are reserved for forestry, reclamation,
conservation, etc. However, of particular interest here are the lands which
have been reserved for military projects or such purposes as defense hous-
ing 5 or atomic energy development,0 all of which require the presence of
1. State v. Tully, 31 Mont. 365, 78 Pac. 760 (1904).
2. United States v. Tully, 140 Fed. 899 (9th Cir. 1905).
3. H.R. REP. No. 3116, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1949).
4. GRAPHIC NoTEs ON Tra, PuBLIc DOMAIN 2 (Dep't of the Interior, Bureau
of Land Management 1950).
5. California ceded jurisdiction to the United States over land acquired for hous-
ing by Cal. Laws 1943, c. 96, § 1.
6. For a full discussion of the acquisition of land for and jurisdiction over
the atomic energy project at Los Alamos, New Mexico see Arledge v. Mabry, 52
N.M. 66, 201 P.24 782 (1949),
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numerous people as residents of federal areas. The steady expansion of
federal activities, especially in the last twenty years, has resulted in the
acquisition of increasingly large amounts of land for such purposes. Con-
sequently the problems raised by the growing complexity of this federal-
state relationship are affecting a constantly increasing proportion of the
population, civilian as well as military. 7 It is the purpose here to point out
these problems of the federal areas and evaluate the methods by which they
may be overcome.
Acquisition of land and jurisdiction.-The Constitution provides for
only two relationships of the federal government to land. One is the regu-
lation of the territories held in trust for the states.8  The other is the power
of Congress to exercise exclusive legislation over:
"such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession
of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;-" 9
The latter description was originally contemplated as referring only to
places necessary for military installations."0 However, the courts have
construed "other needful buildings" to mean whatever structures are found
necessary to the performance of the functions of the federal government.
Thus interpreted this phrase has been the authority for purchasing sites for
7. The following table shows the distribution of land areas under federal juris-
diction among some of the major agencies in 1949:
Agency Acreage
Dep't of the Interior 262,155,710
Dep't of Agriculture 167,656,498
Dep't of the Air Force 11,738,806
Dep't of the Army* 9,020,424
Dep't of the Navy 2,345,496
T.V.A. 891,196
Atomic Energy Comm'n. 487,519
* Military lands include 3,409,066 acres acquired by purchase or condemnation
and 3,130,533 acres acquired by transfer from other Federal agencies. Note 3
stpra at 3 and 4. It is estimated that "acquired lands" for civilian purposes doubled
from the time of the recovery and conservation activities of the early New Deal to
the time of World War II. Likewise, war agencies increased their holdings of
"acquired lands" many fold prior to and during the war and held about 10,000,000
such acres when the war ended. Note 4 supra at 3. The Bureau of the Census has
compiled no figures for the population of such federal areas. Communication to
the UcxvEasinr oF PENNSYLVANiA LAWv R~vmrw from C. E. Batschelet, Chief,
Geography Division, Bureau of the Census, dated April 11, 1952, on file in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania.
8. U.S. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
9. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
10. THE FEI AxusT, No. 43 at 279-280 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1943); 5 Eaor's DE-
i3ATs 510-512 (1845). For a discussion of the history of the adoption of clause
17 see Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and
the States in Landholding, 28 TEXAs L. REv. 43, 57-62 (1949).
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post office buildings," court houses,' 2 soldiers' homes,13 hotels 14 and other
buildings. For almost a century the federal government acquired what
land it needed by the method specified by the Constitution: purchase with
the consent of the states. Such consent usually reserved to the states the
right to serve civil and criminal process within the area.' 5 This reserva-
tion was upheld as a precaution against such lands becoming asylums for
fugitives from justice,' but any qualifications beyond this were deemed
incompatible with exclusive federal jurisdiction.' 7 Then in Kohl v. United
States '- the Supreme Court marked the way for another method of ac-
quisition by holding that "the right of eminent domain . . . [in the fed-
eral government] . . . may be exercised within the states, so far as is
necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the Con-
stitution." 19
The outstanding decision relating to jurisdiction over federal lands
was Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe.20 The Court, per Mr. Justice Field,
held that when land is acquired other than by purchase with consent, the
states, in ceding jurisdiction to the United States, can reserve such powers
as are not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the purpose
intended.21 The two latest developments in this area have been decisions
holding that a state may reserve powers other than the right to serve
process even over lands purchased with consent 22 and may cede juris-
diction over lands acquired for a purpose not specified in Art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution. 23  Of course, where no jurisdiction has vested in the United
States its status is merely that of a proprietor.
24
THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction.-Exclusive jurisdiction over federal
areas necessarily creates problems affecting the inhabitants thereof. They
are not residents of the state.2 5 They may not be entitled to the benefits
11. Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1907).
12. State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763 (1897).
13. State v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334, 97 S.W. 302 (1906).
14. Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
15. Rogers v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946); State v. Mack, 23 Nev.
359, 47 Pac. 763 (1897) ; In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31 (C.C.D. Neb. 1896).
16. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
17. Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass. 1841).
18. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
19. Id. at 372.
20. 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
21. The jurisdiction reserved was to "serve civil or criminal process" and to
"tax railroad, bridge, and other corporations, their franchises and property, on said
Reservation." Kansas Laws 1875, p. 95; incorporated by reference, KMA. GEN.
STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 104 (1935).
22. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
23. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938) (jurisdiction
ceded over land to be used for a national park).
24. 2 STORY, CoNsTrunIoN §§ 1214-1235 (5th ed. 1891); Fort Leavenworth
R.R. v. Lowe, supra note 15 at 527.
25. Bank of Phoebu v. Byrum, 110 Va. 708, 67 S.E. 349 (1910).
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of state laws 26 and conversely may not be subject to its penalties and
taxes. 27
Such a situation is bound to create difficulties for the states. For
example, lacking the power of taxation over such an area, a state is deprived
of valuable sources of revenue. Not only are federal instrumentalities
immune,28 but state excise,29 capitation 30 and personal property taxes 31
may be of no effect within the area. In the case of inheritance taxes the
state has the burden of proving that the deceased was a state resident.32
A corporation acting solely within a federal area cannot be taxed for the
privilege of doing business within the state.3 3 Furthermore, states have no
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the area.3 4 Regulatory legis-
lation such as licensing requirements 3 5 or municipal building ordinances 3 6
may be inapplicable; nor can a state confiscate liquor in transit to a military
post, though its importation is forbidden by state law.
3 7
Many anomalous situations arise in the procedural aspects of litigation.
The property of a resident of a federal enclave may be subject to attach-
ment as that of a non-resident though geographically he is within the
state; 38 and for the purpose of serving process upon a corporation which
is on federal land, such corporation is deemed not to be doing business
within the county. 9 Likewise, if a breach of contract action arises on a
federal area the state court has no jurisdiction.40  However, where Congress
26. See note 17 supra.
27. Pundt v. Pendleton, 167 Fed. 997 (N.D. Ga. 1909).
28. Falls City Brewing Co. v. Reeves, 40 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316 (U.S. 1819).
29. State v. Blair, 328 Ala. 377, 191 So. 237 (1939).
30. United States v. Naylon, 3 Alaska 88 (1906).
31. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1929).
32. In re Grant's Estate, 83 Misc. 257, 144 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1913).
33. Winston Bros. v. State Tax Commission, 156 Ore. 505, 62 P.2d 7 (1937).
34. Rogers v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1946); People v. Hillman, 246
N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400 (1927); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S.
274 (1909); Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908); State v Mack, 23 Nev.
359, 47 Pac. 763 (1897). But cf. In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1895)
(where United States had not declared necessity for exclusive jurisdiction, land
purchased for a purpose not within Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution creates
only concurrent jurisdiction).
35. Peterson v. United States, 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951) (United States
has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of the sale of liquor by private per-
sons owning land within a national park); Lynch v. Hammock, 204 Ark. 911, 165
S.W.2d 369 (1942) (physician practicing exclusively on federal area not subject to
Arkansas licensing requirements) ; Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S.
518 (1938) (licensing provisions of California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act un-
enforceable in Yosemite National Park).
36. United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1944). But cf.
Stewart v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940) (New York Labor Law requiring plank-
ing over steel beams applied to contractor constructing post office building for the
federal government).
37. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944).
38. Bank of Phoebus v. Byrunm, 110 Va. 708, 67 S.E. 349 (1910).
39. Neidig v. Century Sprinkler Corp., 60 Dauph. 585 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
40. Hercules Powder Co. v. Ruben, 188 Va. 694, 51 S.E.2d 149 (1949).
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has approved the application of state laws to a federal area it remains the
function of the state court to construe them and an action cannot be re-
moved to a federal court as one arising under the laws of the United
States.41
A more technical but equally important question arises in connection
with the recording of vital statistics. The federal government has no
bureau of vital statistics for recording births and deaths occurring on federal
land. Confusion in this area can be harmful to the individual in view of
the evidentiary value of such documents. As to federal military reserva-
tions, if jurisdiction has not been ceded births and deaths must be reported
to the local authorities. Where there is exclusive federal jurisdiction the
procedure is questionable. There are no Army Regulations or federal laws
which provide for recording such statistics.42  However, state procedure
is usually followed by the Army as a matter of policy.4 Thus, such statistics
for Valley Forge General Hospital are recorded in Chester County, Penn-
sylvania, as if the hospital were in fact within the jurisdiction of the
county."4 A child who is born on a military reservation and whose father
is in the service becomes a citizen of the state of which his father is a
citizen, for a soldier does not lose his citizenship or residency in his home
state during his service in the army.45 However, the citizenship of a child
born to civilians whose only residence is a federal reservation would not
benefit by this fact and there seems to be no answer to his plight. Thus,
while it may be an easy matter to say that X area is under exclusive federal
jurisdiction, the ramifications of this fact are less easily pigeonholed.
Continued Force of State Laws.-The greatest difficulty arising from
the cession of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States is that there
is no complete body of federal law to supplant the state laws from whose
reach the areas are at least theoretically removed. Yet it should not be
expected that the residents of such areas are to live in a legal vacuum.
One attempted solution to this problem was the application of the inter-
national law principle that the laws of the old sovereign, not incompatible
with those of the new, remain in force until changed or abrogated by the
new government.
41. Misner v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. of Cincinnati, 25 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.
Mo. 1938).
42. Communication to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review from Capt.
Loren J. Bullock, Assistant Post Judge Advocate, Valley Forge Army Hospital,
Phoenixville, Penna. (May 12, 1952) on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
43. Ibid.; Communication to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review from
Col. Devlin, Medical Director, Frankford Arsenal, Phila., Penna. (1952) on file in
the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The records
kept on such reservations are of a private nature rather than taking the place of
the public records of a political subdivision.
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N.E. 595 (1895) ; See also note 43
.sup1'a.
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This doctrine was discussed at some length in Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.
V. McGlinn,4 6 where a suit was brought against the Raifway Company for
the value of a cow killed by a train within the borders of Fort Leavenworth
Military Reservation. A Kansas statute made the railroad liable for the
value of cattle killed by operation of the railway. The defendant maintained
that this law of Kansas became inoperative within the reservation when
jurisdiction was ceded to the United States. The Court held that the in-
ternational law principle applied and that:
"The government of the State of Kansas extended over the Reser-
vation, and its legislation was operative therein, except so far as the
use of the land as an instrumentality of the general government may
have excepted it from such legislation." 47
The same reasoning was applied by a Tennessee court in recognizing
the appointee of the state court as administrator of the estate of a decedent
who had been a resident of a federal soldiers' home. The amount of the
estate was insufficient to bring it within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
and there is no federal probate jurisdiction. The court felt that private
rights must be enforced under state laws which, it was held, continued in
force after the cession of jurisdiction.
48
The difficulty with this reasoning is that the state laws in force at the
time of cession continue in effect indefinitely. 49 Neither a subsequent repeal
by the state 9 0 nor the adoption of a new law has any effect in the federal
area.91 This means that where federal residents are dependent on state
law they may find themselves hampered by outmoded statutes and deprived
of such innovations as have been made to keep step with changing economic
and social needs. A notable example is that of an innkeeper on a federal
reservation who was held liable as an insurer although the state law had
been modernized so that his fellow innkeepers in the state were liable only
for negligence.52 Such an application of obsolescent law produces unreal-
istic results, since, if state law is to govern, it should effect the same legal
relationships for all persons subject to it.
A Jurisdictional Void.-It is quite possible that there may be instances
where neither state nor federal law is applicable to an area. This anomalous
situation usually arises in a field of law concerning which (1) there is no
federal legislation and (2) the particular state statute is inapplicable. An
example is the field of domestic relations, which belongs exclusively to the
law of the states 3 and in which, for certain purposes, state laws have a
46. 114 U.S. 542 (1885).
47. Id. at 547.
48. Divine v. Unaka National Bank, 125 Tenn. 98, 140 S.W. 747 (1911).
49. Danielson v. Donmopray, 57 F.2d 565 (D. Wyo. 1932).
50. McCarthy v. R.G. Packard Co., 105 App. Div. 436, 94 N.Y. Supp. 203
(1905).
51. United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (U.S. 1832).
52. Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
53. McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1941).
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residency or similar requirement limiting their application to the "county"
or "state." " Ma'ryland was the first state to hold that a resident of a
federal reservation is not a resident of the state so as to be entitled to sue
for divorce in the state courts. 5 i Similar decisions have since been ren-
dered in other states.56 As there is no divorce jurisdiction in the federal
courts in respect to such areas 5 the party must either abandon his suit
or move to some state and establish a residence for the statutory period.
Maryland has since enacted legislation providing that all persons resid-
ing within the physical boundaries of the state but on property over which
jurisdiction is exercised by the federal government shall be considered
residents of the state for the purposes of jurisdiction of the equity courts
in applications for divorce or the annulment of marriage. 5s Iansas, too,
has met the difficulty by similar legislation. Its provision allows one who
has been a resident on a federal military reservation within its borders for
one year to sue for a divorce in a court of an adjoining county.5 9 The
Kansas statute was subsequently upheld by the state court. 60  Authority
for such legislation was based on the assumption that it made no change
in the substantive law which was in force at the time of cession; it merely
made possible the use of convenient courts for the enforcement of prior
existing law. In 1943, Georgia reached the same result by Constitutional
amendment which was ratified by the voters.6 ' Aside from these measures
the problem in other states remains unsolved.
A similar obstacle exists as regards the right of inhabitants of a federal
area to vote.6 2  Since state constitutions limit the franchise to citizens or
residents of the state 63 it has been held that residents of federal reserva-
54. Consider a few of Pennsylvania's requirements as to residence in other
contexts. The Pennsylvania Constitution makes residence in the state a prerequisite
for voting, PA. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 1; for holding county office, PA. CoNsr. Art.
XIV, § 3; and provides that the public school system is for children of the Com-
monwealth, PA. CoNsT. Art. X, § 1. By statute a bona fide residence in the state
for one year is necessary for filing a petition for divorce, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 16 (Purdon Supp. 1950), and residence in the state at the time of entering the
service is necessary to qualify one for a soldier's bonus, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,
§ 443-2 (Purdon Supp. 1951). Marriage licenses and the authority to issue them
refer to a county within the state, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1 (Purdon Supp.
1950). These are typical of the requirements in most states.
55. Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 Atl. 729 (1926).
56. Chaney v. Chaney, 53 N.M. 66, 201 P.2d 782 (1949); Dicks v. Dicks,
177 Ga. 379, 170 S.E. 245 (1933).
57. "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States
upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony. . . ." Barker v.
Barker, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858). This is not true of the District of Columbia
where jurisdiction over divorce or annulment is in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, D.C. CoDE tit. 16, §416 (1940), nor in the territorial posses-
sions.
58. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 16, § 39 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
59. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 60, § 1502 (1935).
60. Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464, clarification denied, 144 Kan.
155, 58 P.2d 1101 (1936).
61. Ga. Laws 1943, tit. 1, pp. 68-69.
62. See note 17 stepra.
63. E.g., PA. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 1.
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tions cannot qualify as voters.64 In Herken v. Glynn 11 suffrage was denied
to inmates of a federal soldiers' home. An interesting dissent6 6 made the
argument that state residency could be found in the enabling act admitting
Kansas to the Union which provided that the "state shall consist of all the
territory included within the following boundaries. . " ." The federal
home was situated within these boundaries; ipso facto its inhabitants were
residents of the state. A different point was raised in Arledge v. Mabry,67
which concerned the legality of votes cast on the Los Alamos area in New
Mexico. The court held that the people living on that portion of the land
over which exclusive jurisdiction was not exercised qualified as voters.
However, since their votes had been cast at polling places on the part of
the reservation that was under federal jurisdiction, the votes had not been
cast in New Mexico as required by the state constitution. 8
At the present time a petition is before the circuit court of Frederick
County, Maryland on behalf of civilian residents at Camp Detrick, Mary-
land, over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction. The
petition seeks a declaratory judgment as to the status of the complainants
under Maryland laws.6 9 One of the chief contentions is taxation without
representation: 7 some of the complainants have been denied the right to
vote, but have paid (under protest) state income taxes. In addition,
clarification of other rights and obligations is being sought.7
1
While the right to vote perhaps is unchallenged in many instances,
nevertheless the question is important, for frequently it has been raised in
connection with small local elections where the disqualification of a few
votes could swing the election. 72
It is possible, but not probable, that a "void" may result where both
federal and state courts could have jurisdiction. Thus in the Tully cases,73
each court was so anxious not to usurp the jurisdiction of the other that the
lesser evil seemed to be to have the murderer go unpunished. 74 It seems
that this is an almost isolated situation.
An even more technical dispute arises, and is left unanswered, in the
case of marriage. No federal law of marriage exists and most states limit
64. McMahon v. Polk, 10 S.D. 296, 73 N.W. 77 (1897) ; In re Town of High-
lands, 22 N.Y. Supp. 137 (1892) ; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869). But ef.
La Duke v. Melin, 43 N.D. 349, 177 N.W. 673 (1920) (validating votes on the
ground that the military reservation had been abandoned and therefore the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States had ceased to exist); and Johnson v. Morrill, 20
Cal.2d 446, 126 P.2d 873 (1942) (allowing registration of voters in federal area
on ground that exclusive jurisdiction was never exercised).
65. 151 Kan. 855, 101 P.2d 946 (1940).
* 66. Id. at 870, 101 P.2d at 956 (dissenting opinion).
67. 52 N.M. 303, 197 P.2d 884 (1948).
68. N.M. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 1.
69. No. 17373, Equity, Cir. Ct. Frederick Co., Md. filed July 7, 1952.
70. Baltimore Sun, Aug. 7, 1952.
71. See note 69 supra.
72. See, e.g., Sinks v. Reese, slpra note 64.
73. Supra notes 1 and 2.
74. See text at notes 1 and 2 supra.
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the effectiveness of marriage licenses to counties within the state.75 Like-
wise, the authority of a clerk to issue a license is so limited.76 The result
of an attack on the validity of a marriage performed under a state license
but solemnized on a federal reservation is in doubt. Apparently there has
been no such determination. 77 While provisions upholding the validity of a
marriage performed in good faith 7 s or the recognition of a common law
marriage 79 may operate to validate such marriages, this is a poor solution
to the problem. Although the policy reasons for upholding such mar-
riages are exceptionally strong, (particularly in the light of the large
number of marriages that are solemnized on federal reservations),80 and
courts would strain to uphold them, it would be more desirable to have an
applicable statute which would allay the possibility of subsequent attack.
This could be done by each state individually 81 or by Congress providing
that states have jurisdiction over such areas for the purpose of regulating
marriages.
Certainly these problems are of great interest to the resident of a fed-
eral area. One may never become involved in a tort or contract action, but
may very well want to marry, vote or send one's child to a county school.8 2
75. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1950).
76. Ibid.
77. An action was started to annul a marriage solemnized by a chaplain at the
Valley Forge General Hospital under a Chester Co., Pa. marriage license. The
theory of the case was lack of authority in the chaplain to perform the marriage
under a state license. Campbell v. Smalet, Superior Court of New Jersey, Somer-
set Co., Chancery Division, Docket #M-439-51 (1951). Subsequently the action
was abandoned in part because of (1) the Pennsylvania law making the child of
an annulled marriage a bastard and (2) the probable reluctance of the court to es-
tablish a precedent of this kind without a clear statutory mandate, in view of the
number of marriages of this type that would be affected and the strong public policy
against the dissolution of a marriage. Communication to the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review from George G. Mutnick, attorney for the plaintiff, (Mar. 13,
1952) on file Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
78. Kentucky has a statutory provision for good faith as follows: "No mar-
riage solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be
invalid for the want of such authority, if it is consummated with the belief of the
parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully
married." KY. REV. STAT. c. 402, §070 (1942). This has been construed to cover
the situation of marriage by a Chaplain on a reservation under federal jurisdiction
in the state although technically, since he does not reside in the state, he has no au-
thority to perform such a marriage under state law. (Informal opinion of the
Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, 1944 by Communication to the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review from Lt. Col. Ray K. Smathers, Ft. Holabird, Mary-
land, [Mar. 15, 1952] on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.) When the marriage ceremony is shown to have been performed
there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the marriage. Griffith v.
Lunney, 300 Ky. 66, 187 S.W.2d 431 (1945).
79. Buradus v. General Cement Products Co., 356 Pa. 349, 52 A.2d 205 (1947).
80. Note the large number of wartime marriages and also, long recognized,
the popularity of having marriages performed at Annapolis and West Point. Mar-
riages at the latter Academy are performed under licenses obtained in New York
State. There seems to be no statutory provision that covers this situation if West
Point is not considered a part of the state. See N.Y. DoMEsTIc RMATIONs LAW
§ 11 et seq.
81. See text at note 116 et seq. infra.
82. For discussion of this, see Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580 (Mass.
1841).
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RECOGNITION AND REMEDY
Federal Actions as to Crimes.-The problems created by the federal
areas have not remained unnoticed, although to some extent they have been
ignored. The latter can be accounted for in various ways. For one thing,
cases raising these problems comprise but a small proportion of total litiga-
tion over the country as a whole. Also, for many years such areas existed
mainly for military purposes and their inhabitants consisted of a limited
number of military personnel governed, in many cases, by army or navy
regulations. It is only recentlythat federal projects have required that a
great concentration of civilian employees be domiciled on federal lands for
numerous and divergent purposes.
As early as 1825 a federal criminal statute provided that when a crime
was committed on a federal area within a state and no punishment was
specified such punishment should be fixed according to state laws govern-
ing the same crime.83 Subsequently, at intervals over the years, various
Assimilative Crimes Acts have been passed, each providing that, as to fed-
eral reservations, in the absence of a federal crime, the state laws then in
force should apply as federal laws. 4 Conventional holdings that only the
laws in force at the time of such enactment are effective 8 5 necessitated this
periodic adoption to keep abreast of changes in the state criminal laws.
Nevertheless, long intervals between adopting statutes have produced great
discrepancies between the laws which apply in the states and in the federal
areas within them.88
The new Criminal Code of the United States 87 contains a section
which provides that:
"Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or here-
after reserved or acquired as provided in § 7 of this title,88 is guilty of
any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enact-
ment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession or District
in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time
of such act or omission 89 shall be guilty of a like offense and subjected
to a like punishment." 90
83. 4 STAT. 115 (1825).
84. The Criminal Statutes were as follows: 14 STAT. 13 (1866) ; 30 STAT. 717
(1898), 35 STAT. 1145 (1909); 48 STAT. 152 (1933); 49 STAT. 394 (1935); 54
STAT. 234 (1940), 18 U.S.C. §468 (1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 683 (1948), 18
U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).
85. Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1909); United States v. Paul, 6
Pet. 141 (U.S. 1832).
86. There was one forty year period between the first statute aimed at adopting
state law, 4 STAT. 115 (1825), and 14 STAT. 13 (1866) which was really the first of
the Assimilative Crimes Acts. (However, the Act of 1825 was the basis for these
later enactments).
87. 18 U.S.C. (1948).
88. § 7 refers to jurisdiction on the high seas and also such federal areas as are
here under discussion.
89. Italics added.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).
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The italicized provision was specifically put in to cover future changes in
state law and render unnecessary periodic pro forma amendments to keep
abreast of changes in local law.9 '
The difficulty with this approach is that although the adoption of exist-
ing state law is proper 92 the courts have repeatedly implied that the adop-
tion of prospective state legislation would be open to attack as an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power by Congress to the states.93 This defense
has been set up frequently in criminal cases arising under the federal
statutes. Each time the court has avoided deciding the question by holding
that the statute only gave effect to the existing laws of the state; each time
the court implied that if the delegation question had been reached it might
have been determinative.9 4 While there is no specific decision on delegation
in this area there is recent dictum which suggests that the argument has
not lost its vitality. 95 Possibly a court would go out of its way to uphold
such legislation in view of its obvious desirability. Such a test is likely to
arise in connection with the specific wording of the new Criminal Code, but
so far it is unchallenged.
Federal Action in Civil Mlatters.-Ameliorative legislation outside the
criminal field has been of a more limited scope. The most notable progress
has come in recent years with the enactment of statutes dealing with
specific areas of law. In 1928 Congress provided for the application of
state laws in actions for wrongful death or injury occurring within a
national park or other area under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government.96  The right of action for death exists "as though the place
were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose boundaries such
place may be," 97 while that for injuries "shall be governed by the laws of
the State. .. ." 9s The attempted application of these provisions proved
less comprehensive than desired. For example, industrial insurance and
91. 18 U.S.C. § 13, reviser's note (Supp. 1952).
92. Washington, P. & 0. Ry. v. Magruder, 198 Fed. 218 (D. Md. 1912).
93. The Federal Statute "does not purport to delegate to the state of South
Dakota authority at any time in the future to fix, ad libitum, the punishment of
federal offenses. This it could not do." Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773,
779 (8th Cir. 1906). To the same effect, Congress "would hardlly be willing
beforehand to adopt all the criminal statutes a state might in future enact. A
Statute to this effect might be classed as delegating legislative authority, which is
not proper." United States v. Barnaby, 51 Fed. 20, 23 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892).
94. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943) ; Washington, P. & 0. Ry. v.
Magruder, 198 Fed. 218 (C.C.D. Md. 1912); Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S.
559 (1909); Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773 (8th Cir. 1906); United
States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518 (W.D. Ky. 1903) ; United States v. Barnaby, 51
Fed. 20 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892).
95. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 439 (1946) (obviously
sidestepping the delegation question in dealing with a provision of the McCarran
Act [59 STAT. 33, 34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945) ] consenting to state regulation
of insurance companies).
96. 45 STAT. 54 (1928), 16 U.S.C. §457 (1941).
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
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workmen's compensation acts were held to be ineffective in federal areas. 99
The reasoning supporting this conclusion was that the federal statute
referred to actions at law while the state workmen's compensation statutes
had abolished actions at law for negligence and substituted a whole new
system.10 0 On the other hand the 1928 Act has been the authority for the
incorporation of a subsequently enacted state guest statute, by interpreting
"the laws of the state" to mean existing law as declared from time to
time.' 0 ' Congress has now filled the gap created by these decisions by
vesting authority in the states to apply their respective workmen's compen-
sation laws to all lands and buildings owned or held by the United States
"in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries
such place may be." 102 The law also specifically states that the United
States does not relinquish jurisdiction for any purpose over the property
named except to the extent enumerated above. While this section was not
applicable to causes of action arising before its enactment ' 03 it has subse-
quently rounded out the attempt to place state and federal employees on an
equal footing in respect to their rights of recovery. 104 Thus:
"The effect of this Act is, therefore, to restore the status quo ante,
and the purpose was to make sure that employees of contractors during
work on a federal building in a federal area would be able to recover
compensation benefits for disability or death." 105
The legislation having the greatest scope and effect is that which re-
stored to the states some power of taxation within federal areas. By an
Act of Congress in 1940, motor fuel, sales and use, and personal income
taxes may be levied in such areas by the states,'- 6 thus providing an ap-
preciable increase in revenue.'0 7 Such provisions are limited to the extent
99. Martin v. Clinton Construction Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 35, 105 P.2d 1029
(1940) ; Pound v. Goulding, 237 Ala. 387, 187 So. 468 (1939) (the workmen's com-
pensation law did not apply so the old Employers Liability Act remained in force in
the area) ; Utley v. State Industrial Commission, 176 Okla. 255, 55 P.2d 762 (1936) ;
Murray v. Gerrick & Co., 172 Wash. 365, 20 P.2d 591 (1933), aff'd, 291 U.S. 315
(1934) (holding the Washington Industrial Insurance Act unenforceable).
100. Ibid.
101. Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 45, 76 N.E.2d 101 (1947).
102. 49 STAT. 1938, 1939 (1936), 40 U.S.C. §290 (1946).
103. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. DiLeo, 298 Mass. 401, 10
N.E.2d 251 (1937).
104. Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1943); Young, Adm'r
v. Tarlton, Contractor, Inc., 204 Ark. 283, 162 S.W.2d 477 (1942); Ottinger Bros.
v. Clark, 191 Okla. 488, 131 P.2d 94 (1942). All of these cases uphold recovery
under state compensation acts.
105. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cardillo, 141 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
106. 54 STAT. 1059 (1940), 4 U.S.C. § 13 (1940) as amended, 61 STAT. 641
(1947), 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-106 (Supp. 1951).
107. These are among the highest revenue producing taxes levied by the states.
See tables STATISTiCAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNIrE STAREs 393 (Bur. Census 70th ed.
1949).
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that instrumentalities of the United States are still immune.0 s This im-
munity is fortified by statute; 109 however, national parks are included,110
which should provide a substantial basis for additional receipts."' The
income tax provision was discussed in Kiker v. City of Philadelphia."
2
Justice Drew, after calling attention to the great lack of uniformity in the
tax field, remarked that:
"For the purpose of correcting these anomalous situations, it seems
to us, and to enable State taxation to fall alike upon all who earned
income in the state within whose boundaries the reservation was
located, and in recognition of the generosity of the states which had
granted to the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction over land
within their respective territorial limits without reserving the right of
taxation Congress, in the best interests of our dual forms of govern-
ment, enacted Pub. Act No. 819." 113
This thought could as appropriately be applied to the other tax provisions.
Another recent provision of general effect is that the United States
is no longer required to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over its lands and
until notice is filed with the governor of the state it shall be conclusively
presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted." 4 This is a reversal
of the former policy, and can have the desirable effect of leaving the states
with jurisdiction rather than forcing it on the federal government. For
while it may seem that exclusive jurisdiction is a logical concomitant of
federal ownership and use of land, it is impractical and undesirable from
many viewpoints. In most instances the government does not need exclu-
sive jurisdiction to carry on the projects for which the area is acquired.
Mere lack of interference by the states with the actual federal functions
themselves should be sufficient. Moreover, as seen above, the federal
government does not offer the inhabitants of federal areas the advantages
of local government. The various federal statutes make it apparent that the
attention of Congress has been called to some of the most recurrent problems
of the federal areas. But these statutes are only hesitant steps toward the
solution of the jurisdictional-geographical dichotomy.
108. This doctrine was first set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(U.S. 1819).
109. 54 STAT. 1059 (1940), 4 U.S.C. § 13 (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 641
(1947), 4 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 1951) (specifically providing for the immunity of
instrumentalities of the United States).
110. 38 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 522 (1936).
111. Sales and motor fuel taxes within National Parks would seem to be a
lucrative source of revenue in view of the increasing numbers of visitors to such
areas. 174 such areas received 24,934,669 visitors in 1948. STAr~ScCa.L AasRAcr
OF THE UNITED STATES 164, table 197 (Bur. Census 70th ed. 1949).
112. 346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289 (1943). This case decided that the Philadelphia
wage tax applied to workers in federal areas, specifically the Philadelphia Navy
Yard.
113. Id. at 636, 31 A.2d at 296.
114. Rav. STAT. § 355, as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940).
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State Action.-There is a dearth of legislation by the states relating
to federal areas within their boundaries. As mentioned above, Kansas,
Maryland and Georgia have changed their residency requirements for di-
vorce so as to include the residents of federal areas." 5 In the same vein,
in 1951 the Pennsylvania Senate passed a bill which provided that all
marriages solemnized by a chaplain on a federal reservation within the
borders of the state under a state marriage license be considered of the same
validity as those performed within the Commonwealth. It likewise pro-
vided for the validity of future marriages by authorizing the issuance of
marriage licenses stating that the marriage is to be performed within a
federal area. 1 0 The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives but was not brought out of Committee before the
end of the session.117 It is odd that more legislation of this nature has not
been passed in view of the various actions which have failed because of
some technical state requirement," s and which could be cured by statute or,
less readily, constitutional amendment.
A second and increasingly important state solution has been to avoid
the problem at the outset by reserving certain powers to the state in the act
ceding jurisdiction. The old idea that only the reservation of service of
process was compatible with exclusive federal jurisdiction has been modi-
fied to a great extent."x9  While the first reservations were of jurisdiction
over railroad rights of way ' 20 or roads and their upkeep,' 2 1 subsequently
such things as voting were included. Tennessee tried to reserve the fran-
chise for inmates of a federal soldiers' home, but the state court held that
this was unconstitutional on the ground that residency at the home was not
such residence as the state constitution required.122  However, since that
decision California has reserved the franchise for the inhabitants of Kings
Canyon National Park; 12 and in Johnson v. Morrill 124 the California
court held that residents of land acquired under the Lanham Act,125 if other-
wise qualified, were entitled to register as voters. The Supreme Court of
Kansas reached the same conclusion, 2 6 the authority for both decisions
being a provision in a federal housing act that the civil rights of the resi-
115. Ga. Laws 1943, tit. 1, pp. 68-69; KAN'. Gro. STAT. ANN. c. 60, § 1502
(1949) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWs art. 16, § 39 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
116. Pa. Sen. Bill No. 846, 139th Sess. (1951).
117. COMMONWEALTH: OF PENNSYLVANIA, HISTORY OF SENATE BILs 182 (Last
Sess. 1951).
118. See pp. 130-2 supra.
119. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
120. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
121. See United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 133 (1930).
122. State v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334, 97 S.W. 299 (1906).
123. Cal. Laws 1943, c. 96, § 1
124. 20 Cal.2d 446, 126 P.2d 873 (1942).
125. 54 STAT. 1125 (1940), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1506, 1524, 1553, 1575,
1575n (Supp. 1949). This Act is concerned with war housing.
126. State v. Corcoran, 155 Kan. 714, 128 P.2d 999 (1942).
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dents of the area would not be denied.127 This was interpreted as including
voting.
Perhaps a more far-reaching reservation is the right to tax which has
been upheld as compatible with federal jurisdiction. 128 Probably the broad-
est retention of power is that discussed in James v. Dravo Contracting
Co..29  This is West Virginia's reservation of "such other jurisdiction and
authority over the area as is not inconsistent with the jurisdiction ceded to
the United States." Under this, a gross receipts tax on businesses carried
on within the area solely for the federal government was held valid.
Of course, once the state has ceded jurisdiction over an area it cannot
impose additional restrictions, but Congress can recede jurisdiction to the
states.' 30 Reservation by the states, plus the fact that exclusive federal
jurisdiction is no longer presumed without notice 1-1 should enable the
states to maintain a greater degree of control over areas ceded in the future.
EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Undoubtedly the correction of any problems, no matter how small,
is a step in the right direction. However, it would seem that any real
solution of the federal area difficulties must be comprehensive in scope.
Looking to the states for relief is unsound. While it is possible that those
problems which are purely local in origin, as the requirements for divorce
and voting 13 2 could be solved by state legislation, it is doubtful that this
will be done, judging by the paucity of even isolated attempts in the past.
Nor would such legislation cover all the areas of dispute.
Frequently it has been suggested that Congress enact a complete body
of law for the areas under its jurisdiction. This would be a major task
in itself and in reality is probably not necessary. Furthermore, in all
probability there would remain a discrepancy between that law and the law
of the state so that the federal residents would remain as isolated as ever.
Again, judging from past action, Congress is in no hurry so to act. On
the other hand, periodic legislation by Congress to adopt state law, runs
afoul of obsolescence. Unless there is frequent enactment at short intervals
there is bound to be a lag.
The most sensible solution, assuming its constitutionality, is that set
forth in the new criminal legislation, 3 3 which sanctions the application of
both existing and prospective state law. By an Act of Congress generally
adopting such state law, either in specified areas or in all fields of law except
127. 54 STAT. 1128 (1940), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1547 (1946).
128. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 186 (1937)
(gross receipts tax on receipts of contractors working for the government at Grand
Coulee Dam).
129. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
130. 49 STAT. 1938, 1939 (1936), 40 U.S.C. §290 (1946).
131. See note 114 supra.
132. See e.g., note 54 supra.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1948) (providing for the application of state laws in force
at the time the act is committed).
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certain ones, the problems largely could be solved. An equally sound solu-
tion might be recession of jurisdiction by the United States to the states
except such as is absolutely necessary for carrying on the actual federal
functions.
As to lands to be acquired in the future, it is doubtful whether there
is need or justification for the federal government to take exclusive juris-
diction.134 The jealousy of the original states and the necessity of having
exclusive jurisdiction to insure the unhampered use of federal areas for
defense purposes 135 have disappeared. The states could reserve at the out-
set all powers except those required to attain the purposes for which the
land is procured, the determination of which could be handled by the courts.
Thus it seems that the problem is not without solution. All of these
devices have been tried sporadically. There remains the task of stimulating
further accomplishment along these lines.
134. See REv. STAT. § 355, as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1940).
135. THE FEmDiRisT No. 43 at 279, 280 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1943); Patterson,
The Relation} of the Federal Govermnemt to the Territories and the States in Land-
holding, 28 TEXAs L. REv. 43, 57-62 (1949).
